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By CYNTHIA SHORTHILL AND J.C.H. JONES*
The object of this paper is twofold: to determine the extent to which enforcement
of the Combines Investigation Act from 1970-1981 was guided by the goal of
maximizing economic efficiency; and to ascertain the roles - facilitating or
frustrating - played by the government and the Bureau of Competition Policy. The
former is accomplished by correlating Bureau enforcement activity with estimates
of allocative. inefficiency. The latter is accomplished by treating the Bureau as a
utility maximizer subject to the constraints imposed by the legislation and the
structures set up to administer and adjudicate the statute. Our conclusions are that:
enforcement activity is not guided by efficiency considerations; and the chief reason
is the government constraints, particularly the wording of the legislation and its
implicit support of the economic analysis of the courts.
Despite Carlyle's characterization of economics as the "dismal
science,"1 in policy matters economists tend to be, by turn, naive,
optimistic, and cynical. Naive, because they think their models give
rise to predictions which can have implications for policy; optimistic,
because they feel that if the predictions are empirically validated
then they have definitive policy implications; and, ultimately, cynical,
because they realize that, in economic policy matters, economic
analysis is frequently the first casualty. Consider, for example,
resource allocation and antitrust.
CCopyright, 1990, C. Shorthill and J.C.H. Jones.
* Univ. of Victoria. The authors would like to thank L. Laudadio for helpful comments.
Thomas Carlyle, Latter Day Pamphlets No. 1: The Present Tune, in Oxford Dictionary
of Quotations, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979) at 131.
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A basic prediction of neoclassical price theory is that, ceteris
paribus, imperfect markets lead to allocative inefficiency. Since there
is some empirical evidence to substantiate this proposition,2 efforts
to correct it should be judged, presumably, by their ability to
improve economic efficiency. Thus, even though differences exist as
to the seriousness of the misallocative problem and the best way to
rectify it, there is a consensus among economists that the efficiency
criterion is the one analytically justified goal of antitrust.3 Or, to
paraphrase Elzinga, if not efficiency, what else counts?4
Unfortunately, in the real world of antitrust enforcement, a
number of things count, all of which seem to result in downgrading
the significance of the efficiency criterion. The literature suggests
two reasons for this state of affairs. First, the existence of a menage
of ends (equity, fairness, dispersion of political power, protection of
small business, etc.), all of which appear incompatible with, but in
the last analysis are ranked superior to, efficiency.
2 The reference is to the studies of "welfare loss." In the United States the loss figure
varies between less than 1 and 7 percent of national income, depending on estimating
techniques, assumptions and time periods. A summary is provided by W.G. Shepherd, The
Economics of Industrial Organization, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1985) at 137.
Results from studies in other counties typically fall between the American extremes. For a
sampling see: F. Jenny and A. Weber, "Aggregate Welfare Loss Due to Monopoly Power in
the French Economy: Some Tentative Estimates" (1983) 32 J. Indust. Econ. 113; J.C.H.
Jones and L. Laudadio, "The Empirical Basis of Canadian Antitrust Policy: Resource
Allocation and Welfare Losses in Canadian Industry" (1978) 6 Indust. Org. Rev. 49, and M.C.
Sawyer, "Monopoly Welfare Loss in the United Kingdom" (1980) 48 Manchester Sch. Econ.
& Social Stud. 331.
3 The leading exponents of an efficiency based antitrust policy are R.A. Posner, Antitrust
Law, An Economic Perspective (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976) and R.H. Bork,
The Antitrust Paradox (New York: Basic Books, 1978) in particular, and the "Chicago School"
in general. However, O.E. Williamson sees an "analytical convergence" on efficiency by all
"Schools," see "Symposium on Antitrust Law and Economics: Introduction" (1979) 127 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 918 at 924. For the views of various Schools on efficiency, see R.C. Singleton,
Industrial Organization and Antitrust: A Survey of Alternative Perspectives (Columbus:
Publishing Horizons, 1986).
4 K.G. Elzinga, "The Goals of Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What
Else Counts?" (1977) 125 U. Pa. L Rev. 1191.
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Second, the activities of the enforcement agencies which frustrate
the attainment of efficiency
5
The common theme uniting these explanations is the
assumption that governments and bureaucracies act so as to
maximize their own self interest rather than consumer welfare. The
argument is that governments, when drawing up legislation, respond
primarily to the pressures exerted by those groups facilitating their
re-election; and bureaux, in administering the legislation, seek to
optimize some element(s) in their private utility functions.6 The end
result is that, in antitrust, the efficiency criterion - the economist's
grail - plays a distinctly minor role in the attempt to rectify the
misallocative consequences of market failure.
While these criticisms have been directed most pointedly at
U.S. antitrust, a similar situation for a similar set of reasons
potentially exists in Canada. From the standpoint of ends, the
Federal government has frequently articulated the promotion of
economic efficiency as an antitrust goal.7 Indeed, in the revision of
the law in the Competition Act of 1986, to "promote ... efficiency"
was finally made an explicit "purpose" of the legislation! But, there
is also a literature which argues that the operating ends embedded
in the pre-1986 legislation have little to do with efficiency and
merely represent the response of governments to the pressure from
5See W.F. Shughart II and R.D. Tollison, "The Positive Economics of Antitrust Policy:
A Survey Article" (1985) 5 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 39 at 39.
6 For classic expositions of governments and bureaucracies as utility maximizers see A.
Downs, An Economic Theory of Denocracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957) and Inside
Bureaucracy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1967) respectively.
7 The classic statement is by the Justice Minister in 1966, Commons Debates, 31 March
1966. It was explicitly written into the aborted legislation of 1970 (Bill C-256) and 1977 (Bill
C-42); and, according to the Minister, was still an important goal in 1981. See A. Ouellet,
"Notes for an Address to the Montreal Chamber of Commerce" (Mimeo, Ottawa: Department
of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 31 March 1981).
8 Competition Act, R.S.C, c. C-34, 1.1.
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business groups;9 while "efficiency" in the 1986 Act appears in
conjunction with several other ends all of which cannot be achieved
simultaneously
1
From the enforcement side, there is some empirical evidence
to suggest that efficiency is not the guide to enforcement practice
(at least in the mid-1960s), 11 although the bureau responsible (The
Bureau of Competition Policy, hereinafter shortened to the Bureau)
claims allocative efficiency as its guiding end.12 In addition, there is
also evidence that part of the Bureau's behaviour (merger
enforcement, 1960-71) can be explained by a utility maximizing
model in which the objective function is "security.'13 Interestingly
enough, however, and in contrast to the prevailing view on the U.S.
antitrust bureaucracy, it was concluded that the Bureau's behaviour,
in this instance, appeared to move Canadian society closer to
9See G. Rosenbluth and H.G. Thorburn, Canadian Anti-Combines Administration, 1952-
1960 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963); and C.H. Goff and C.E. Reasons,
Corporate Crime in Canada: A Critical Analysis of Anti-Combines Legislation (Toronto:
Prentice-Hall of Canada, 1978).
10 Supra, note 8 reads: "The purpose of this Act is to maintain and encourage
competition in Canada in order to promote the efficiency and adaptability of the Canadian
economy, in order to expand opportunities for Canadian participation in world markets while
at the same time recognizing the role of foreign competition in Canada, in order to ensure
that small and medium-sized enterprises have an equitable opportunity to participate in the
Canadian economy and in order to provide consumers with competitive prices and product
choices." See also MJ. Trebilock, "What are the Costs of Closure" (1986) 7 Can. Compet.
Pol'y Rec. 1 at 1-2.
11 See Jones and Laudadio, supra, note 2.
12 Since 1961 the Annual Report, Director of Investigation and Research, (Combines
Investigation Act) (Ottawa: Supply and Services) [hereinafter Annual Report] has contained
the statement that the purpose of the legislation is to "assist in maintaining effective
competition as a prime stimulus to the achievement of maximum production, distribution and
employment in a mixed system of public and private enterprise." It is difficult to construe
this as meaning anything but allocative efficiency. In 1981, the then Director explicitly said
that "resource allocation" and "economic efficiency" was the main goal of the legislation. See
LA.W. Hunter "Notes for an Address to the ABA National Institute" (Mimeo, Ottawa:
Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 1981).
13 J.C.H. Jones, 'The Bureaucracy and Public Policy: Canadian Merger Policy and the
Combines Branch, 1960-1971" (1975) 18 Can. Pub. Admin. 269.
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maximizing consumer welfare.14 Nevertheless, this conclusion is not
universally accepted and there is continued concern about the
Bureau's behaviour h5
The upshot is that it is not clear to what extent an efficiency
criterion guides Canadian antitrust policy and what role political and
bureaucratic considerations play in its enforcement. Accordingly, the
object of this paper is twofold: to determine the extent to which
enforcement of the Combines Investigation Act from 1970-1981 was
guided by efficiency considerations; and to ascertain the role -
facilitating or frustrating - played by the government and the Bureau
in the process.
The time period is particularly appropriate for three reasons.
One, from 1970 to 1981 the government continually stressed the
significance of efficiency as a policy goal, and the Bureau explicitly
embraced it as a guide.16 Objectively, if these statements are a true
reflection of preferences then the importance of efficiency should
show up in enforcement policy over the period. Two, the period
also encompasses a major effort to reform antitrust policy (the
Combines Act was formally amended in 1976, and there were any
number of aborted legislative changes prior to the introduction of
the Competition Act in 1986)17 so that the political pressures on
government (and the government's response) should also be clear.
14 Ibid. at 296.
15 LA. Skeoch and B.C. McDonald et al., Dynamic Change and Accountability in a
Canadian Market Economy (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1976) at 391, were critical of the
potential "single-minded enthusiasm of the investigators." While E.G West notes, with
apparent approval, Shughart and Tollison's dismissive comment that "The antitrust bureaucracy
operates much like the regulatory bureaucracy ..." supra, note 5 at 51. See E.G. West,
"Canada's Competition Act in the Light of U.S. Experience: A Cautionary Tale," in W.
Block, ed., Reaction: The New Combines Investigation Act (Vancouver. The Fraser Institute,
1986) at 200.
16 Supra, notes 7 and 12.
17 For a discussion of the history of the legislation in the 1960s and 1970s, see I.
Brecher, Canada's Competition Policy Revisited Some New Thoughts on an Old Stoy
(Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1982).
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Finally, 1970-81 is the latest period for which the complete
information necessary for our empirical work is available.
The analysis proceeds in two steps. First, to determine the
degree to which enforcement activity is correlated with efficiency
considerations, we produce estimates of welfare loss (due to
allocative and other cost inefficiencies) by industry, and match them
with the Bureau's case activity! 8 If efficiency is the principal guide
to enforcement practice, the relationship should be close, in so far
as the Bureau, presumably, would concentrate its scarce enforcement
resources where the efficiency loss is greatest 9 This is not our
conclusion.
This failure of enforcement activity to mesh with efficiency
loss obviously requires some explanation. Thus, the second step
considers the impact of political and bureaucratic behaviour on
enforcement activity. Since there is no way this can be quantified,
our method is to treat it as a standard economic problem of utility
maximization under constraint. The objective function is the
bureaucracy's desire to maximize security, and the law, the courts,
and other influences are constraints.
We then ask whether the pattern of enforcement activity is
explicable by the Bureau acting to maximize utility rather than
minimizing efficiency loss, or due to the nature of the constraints.
Our conclusion is that, in most instances, it is the nature of the
constraints (in particular the political ends underlying the legislation
and the interpretations of the courts) which determine the pattern
of enforcement activity. No matter what the Government or the
Bureau claim, efficiency is not an operative guide to enforcement
activity.
The analysis that follows details the rationale for this
conclusion. It is organized into three parts: Part I, estimates of
efficiency loss are reported and the relationship to enforcement
activity is analyzed; Part II, the bureaucratic utility function is
18 See W.F. Long, R. Schramm and R. Tollison, "The Economic Determinants of
Antitrust Activity" (1973) 16 J. L. & Econ. 351; J. Siegfried, "The Determinants of Antitrust
Activity" (1975) 18 J. L. & Econ. 559.
19 This, of course, assumes that the costs of bringing cases are the same so that net
benefits are correlated with efficiency losses. Because of the impossibility of obtaining
enforcement costs, this is the usual assumption. See Long, Schramm and Tollison, ibid.
[voi- 28 No. 2
Canadian Antitrust 1970-1981
outlined and the framework used to examine the results of Part I
and Part III, conclusions are drawn.
I. THE EFFICIENCY CRITERION AND CASE
ENFORCEMENT
The method we use to determine the relationship between
efficiency and enforcement activity is to compare efficiency losses by
industry with the case activity by industry. The working hypothesis
is that, if an efficiency criterion is important, enforcement activity
will be greatest in industries with the largest efficiency losses. This
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A. Efficiency Losses, 1970_198120
The particular model we employ to estimate efficiency losses
(allocative and non-allocative) is a variation on Harberger's partial
equilibrium frameworklY and can be illustrated with reference to
Figure 1.
1. The model
Given a linear demand curve (AR) and constant returns to
scale (MC1 = AC1), competitive price and quantity in a closed
economy are P1 and Q1, respectively. The monopoly price and
quantity (P2, Q2) reduce consumer surplus by the trapezoid P2BEPI,
of which P2BHPJ is a "transfer" from consumers to the monopolist,
and BHE is the "deadweight loss." The latter is an estimate of
allocative inefficiency and can be approximated as,
7r
(1) W 1 = ( ) 2 TRk
where 7r is monopoly profit, TR total revenue, and k the elasticity
of demand.
In an open economy - which seems particularly relevant in
the Canadian case - (1) can be modified by taking into account the
export sector. Two extreme assumptions are possible.22 If export
markets are assumed competitive so that monopoly profits are
earned only in domestic markets, then, with X representing the ratio
of exports to total revenue, (1) becomes,
(2a) W2a = (l-X) TR) 2 (l-X) TRk
20 With the exception of the calculations of equations (2a) and (2b) below, the
estimations of the efficiency loss follows Jones and Laudadio, supra, note 2.
21 A. Harberger, "Monopoly and Resource Allocation" (1954) 44 Amer. Econ. Rev. 77.
22 B. Wahlroos, "The Welfare Cost of Imperfect Industrial Competition in an Open
Economy with an Application to Finland" (1982) 84:3 Scan. J. Econ. 457 at 460.
[VOL 28 No. 2
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If, at the other extreme, we assume that the rates of return on
domestic and export sales are equal, then (1) becomes,
(2b) W 2b. = 1/2 2 (-X) TRk
W2a > W2b because profits earned on exports are a benefit
to the domestic economy.
The non-allocative measures of cost inefficiency are based on
the notion that costs (AC1 = M 1 in Fig. 1) are too high in
monopoly (where price and quantity are P2 and Q2) as compared to
the competitive case where AC2 = M 2 and price and quantity are
P3 and Q3. In this instance, the addition to the original deadweight
loss is HEDL and the area PHLP3 represents the excess costs of
producing 0Q2. Although PILP3 potentially covers a number of
elements23 for estimation purposes we focus on monopoly wages
and advertising expenditures. Monopoly wages represent one item
in the general class of excessive factor remuneration. The argument
is that part of the firm's monopoly profit is passed on to unionized
workers in the form of excess - greater than competitive - wages.
This is approximated as,
24
(3) W2 = (1---v) k 7r + (vk/2) (TR- 7r + k 7r)
where v is the percentage shift in the average cost curve due to the
monopoly wage effect.
With advertising, the rationale for including it as a cost
inefficiency is that most of this expenditure is persuasive, a waste of
23 For a survey of the items which theoretically should be included as measures of cost
inefficiency see JJ. Siegfried and E.H. Wheeler "Cost Efficiency and Monopoly Power A
Survey" (1981) 21 Q. Rev. Econ. & Bus. 25.
24 F.W. Bell, "The Effect of Monopoly Profits and Wages on Prices and Consumers'
Surplus in U.S. Manufacturing" (1968) 6 West. Econ. 1. 233 at 235.
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resources, and useful only for creating entry barriers. It should
therefore be added to monopoly profits.25 Thus, (1) can be written
as,
(4) W4 = 2 TRk
where r represents monopoly profits plus advertising expenditures.
While the elements in equations (1) to (4) do not describe
all items which could lead to efficiency loss, they are the only ones
- given the nature of the data - for which we could produce
reasonable empirical estimates.26 The estimates of these equations
represent, simultaneously, the size of the efficiency loss and a
measure of the potential gross benefits from antitrust enforcement.
2. Data and estimation procedures
Estimates of equations (1) to (4) are derived for a set of 45,
3 digit SIC classified industries from the manufacturing sector.
27
The size of this sample was determined by data availability and all
estimates were made for every year 1970 to 1981. This allows us to
track the changes in W, to W4 inclusive, thus eliminating many of
the transitory difficulties associated with single year estimates. It
should be emphasized at this juncture that the focus on the industry
to estimate W is a matter of operational necessity. Antitrust
legislation is normally constructed to apply to firms and groups of
25 In general see W.S. Comanor and T.A. Wilson, Advertising and Market Power
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974).
26 Posner, for example, would include, the entire "transfer" P1P2BH in FIG. 1, as
wasteful expenditure carried out by the firm to maintain its rents. See R.A. Posner, "The
Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation" (1975) 83 J. Pol. Econ. 887. This, however, may
also be an understatement of the loss because consumers have to defend their "surplus." See
J.T. Wenders, "On Perfect Rent Dissipation" (1987) 77 Am. Econ. Rev. 456. It is also argued
that, under the United States' legislation, the Clayton Act and the Celler-Kefauver
Amendments are not concerned with allocative efficiency but only with "wealth transfers."
See A.A Fisher and R.H. Lande, "Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement" (1983)
71 Ca. L Rev. 1582 at 1589. Thus P1 P2BH must be included.
27 The industry classification scheme, revenue, and profit figures come from Statistics
Canada, Corporate Financial Swtiscs (Ottawa: Supply and Services) for the years 1970-1981.
[VOL. 28 No. 2
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firms smaller than an industry. But, since firm data is simply not
available, we are constrained to focus on the industry as the
enforcement target. However, we note that the degree to which
firms mirror their industry characteristics is highly questionable.
In specific terms, variable definitions, estimating procedures
and data can be summarized as follows.
First, excess profit (7r) in (1), (2a), (2b) and (4) is defined as
the difference between the profit rate (after tax profits/equity, P.%E)
in a specific industry, and the average profit rate (r) for the sample.
However, 7r in (3) is based on estimating the general profit-concen-
tration relationship and then applying the estimated concentration
coefficient to specific industries. Second, TR is defined as "sales"
(S) in all equations and k is assumed to have a value of 2
throughout. Using a k of 2 seems a reasonable compromise between
using the typical unity assumption (k=l) or the more extreme
Kamerschen formulation (k=Shr)3 0
Third, the export data in (2a) and (2b) are obtained
directlyY Because we are unsure of which profitability assumption
is appropriate in the Canadian case, we report the average of W2a
and W2b as W2 in Table 1 below. Fourth, the wage shift variable
(v) in (3) is based on estimating the general relationship between
28 1 n
r = n y Pi/Ei
i=l
29 Briefly, if: r = ao + alX1 ... anX,, where X, is the concentration ratio and X. is
a set of structural variables, then "i = (a1 Xi)Ei. However, because of the lack of data for
the 1970s, problems of multicollinearity and simultaneity, a complete model could not be
estimated. We therefore averaged the concentration coefficients estimated under OLS, 2SLS
and 2SLS Ridge procedures for the mid 1960s and applied it (.04) to estimate i for every
year 1970-1981. The source was PJ. Coxon and J.C.H. Jones, "Positive Economics and Public
Policy: Some Canadian Evidence on Policy Change and Antitrust" (1985) 30 The Antitrust
Bulletin 365.
30 See D.R. Kamerschen, "An Estimation of the 'Welfare Losses' from Monopoly in the
American Economy" (1965) 4 West. Econ. J. 221. The influence of different k can be
illustrated by the fact that the estimates of W1 for the entire manufacturing sector in (c) in
the text below were twenty times as great when k = S/r than when k = 2.
31 Department of Regional Industrial Expansion, Manufacturing Trade and Measures,
1966-1984 (Ottawa: Department of Industry, Trade and Commerce, 1982).
1990]
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wages and concentration and then applying the estimated concen-
tration coefficient to individual industries? 2 Finally, with ,r*, we
assume that the only advertising expenditure which is non-
informative and hence wasteful, is that carried out by consumer (as
opposed to producer) good industries3 3 Again this seems a
reasonable compromise between the literature which sees all
advertising as merely persuasive and entry barrier creating, and that
which sees it as informative and pro-competitive3 4
The empirical results are outlined below.
32 Briefly, if c - a, + a1X1 + a2X2 , where c is average hourly earnings, X1 the 4 firm
concentration ratio, and X2 the industry growth rate; and ei is the share of wages in total
revenue; then vi = ei(aXllei = a1X1). The calculations are made every year, 1970-1981.
The concentration ratio (Xi) and the share of wages in total revenue (ei) are from Statistics
Canada, Industrial Organization and Concentration in the Manufacturing Mining and Logging
Industries (Ottawa: Supply and Services, even years 1970-1982); the industry growth rate (X2),
is the ratio of industry sales 1970 to industry sales 1981 and is from Corporate Financial
Statistics, supra, note 27.
33 Consumer goods are defined as those in which more than fifty percent of the final
output is of non-intermediate goods according to the Canadian Input-Output Table. The only
three digit advertising data for the 1970s was for 1973 in H.E. English and R.F. Owen, The
Role of Marketing in the Concentration and Multinational Control of Manufacturing Indusies
(Ottawa: Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, 1981). We assume that the ratio
of advertising to sales is the same in all years as in 1973.
34 The "standard" view (advertising is an entry barrier) and the "Chicago" and "Austrian"
viewpoints (advertising is necessarily pro competitive) are briefly summarized in Singleton,
supra, note 3 at 9, 45, 58 and 60. The case pro and con is made at some length in Comanor
and Wilson, supra, note 25, and D.A. Worcester, Welfare Gains from Advertising: The
Problem of Regulation (Washington D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978). Note that,
K. Cowling and D.G. Mueller, "The Social Costs of Monopoly Power" (1978) 88 Econ. J.
727; and D.O. Olson and D.L Bumpass, "An Intertemporal Analysis of the Welfare Cost of
Monopoly Power U.S. Manufacturing 1967-1981" (1984) 1 Rev. Indust. Org. 318, include
advertising expenditures of all industries in their estimates.
460
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Table 1
Estimates of Welfare Losses for a Sample of 45 Manufacturing
Industries in Millions of Dollars ($) and as a Percentage (%) of
the Sample, Averaged for 1970, 1976, and 1981.
WI W2 W3 W4
Industry
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3. The empirical results
Table 1 shows the results of calculating the various estimates
(WI, W2 , W3 , W4) of the efficiency loss for the 45 industry sample
from the manufacturing sector.3 The losses are averaged for 1970,
1976, and 1981.36 This seems a reasonable representation as there
is very little change in industry ranking by any component of welfare
loss over the period. In any given industry the size of the loss
depends on which estimate of W is used, but, more important from
the potential enforcement point of view, the losses for any estimate
of W are unevenly distributed between industries. Indeed, the bulk
of the efficiency losses are concentrated in a small number of
industries.
This is illustrated by Table 2 which shows the total losses
(W4 - W, + W2 + W3) for the 10 leading loss industries in 1970,
1976, and 1981. Not only are the losses relatively large as a
proportion of the 45 industry sample in Table 1, but the ranking of
the industries shows a remarkable consistency over the period. 7
This suggests that, if "efficiency" is a serious operative goal of
antitrust as the Bureau has suggested, then enforcement activity
should not only focus on those industries with the largest efficiency
losses but need only concentrate on a relatively small number of
35 It is possible to estimate a welfare loss for the maximum 87 industries in the
manufacturing sector (Wm 87), by extrapolating maximum actual sub-sample sizes (Wi, 87;
W2 , 70; W3 , 52, W4 , 87) to the 87 industries. The actual sub-sample sizes are determined
by data availability. The difference between these sample sizes and the 45 industry sample
in Table I is that the 45 industries were the same every year from 1970 to 1981. The average
Wm 87 from 1970 to 1981 was $441.09 million, or 321 per cent of National Income,
calculated as W4 - W1 + W2 + W3. The welfare loss for a 172 industry sample covering
all sectors of the economy (WE172) can be obtained by extrapolating the manufacturing sector
results (W1 can be estimated for all 172 industries). The average WE172 from 1970 to 1981
was $2974.07 million, or 2.28 per cent of National Income, calculated as W4 - v1 + W2.
36 The results for every year from 1970 to 1981 can be obtained form the authors on
request.
37 The rank correlation coefficients between these three years are .92 and .87
respectively.
462 [VOL 28 No. 2
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industries3 8
Has this, in fact, been the case?
Table 2
Largest Welfare Loss1 Industries, 1970, 1976
and 1981 in Millions of Dollars
S.I.C. CODE INDUSTRY 1970 1976 1981$ $ $
323,325 Motor Vehicles/Parts 14.926 30.688 62.792
291,292 Iron and Steel Mills 14.072 21.174 43.478





151, 153 Tobacco Products 9.820 14.077
105,107 Dairy Products 9.547 20.533 36.551
376 SoapandCleaning 8.068 18.068 37.580
Compounds
161-169 Rubber Products 7.371 10.933 27.630
374 Pharmaceuticals 7.228 12.035 22.755
321 Aircraft and Parts 6.584 30.662
271 PulpandPaperMills 14.171 27.005
112 Fruit and Vegetable 9.306
Canners
251 Sawmills 30.255
1. The Welfare loss for each industry is calculated as
W4 - W1 + W2 + W3
38 This conclusion is similar to that derived in the mid 1960s for Canada, see Jones and
Laudadio, supra, note 2. A similar pattern has consistently emerged in the U.S. See JJ.
Siegfried and T.K. Tiemann, 'The Welfare Cost of Monopoly*. An Inter-Industry Analysis"
(1974) 12 Econ. Inq. 190, and Olson and Bumpass, supra, note 34.
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B. Enforcement Activity, 1970-1981
In -Table 3 we have tabulated the cases investigated (both
prosecutions and discontinued inquiries)39 by the Bureau for the 45
industry sample of Table 1 from 1970-1981. The cases are broken
down by those statutory offenses which have some implication for
efficiency, and the only ones omitted cover "misleading advertising"
which borders more on fraud than anything else.40 Comparison of
these tables indicates that, overall, attempts to rectify inefficiency
play a minor role in enforcement activity: there is little correlation
between the size of the efficiency loss (Table 1), and the number
and inter-industry distribution of investigations (Table 3). This latter
point is reinforced by a comparison between Tables 2 and 3. It
seems that little investigative attention has been paid to motor
vehicles, iron and steel mills and miscellaneous food products - the
leading three loss industries, while distilleries, aircraft, and soap and
cleaning compounds are apparently immune.
Therefore, if we assume that cases against firms in specific
industries represent attempts by the Bureau to come to grips with
efficiency losses in those industries, the inescapable conclusion is
that there is a gap between the declared intention of promoting
efficiency and actual enforcement activity. Preference for efficiency
is not revealed by the Bureau's enforcement behaviour.
39 That is, those cases actually taken to court or investigated but not prosecuted.
40 In this time period misleading advertising has been a growth industry. Between 1970-
71 and 1981-82 over 66,000 "files were opened." This followed a change in the legislation in
1969. In 1969-70, 412 "files were opened," it jumped to 2520 in 1970-71 and peaked at over
10,000 in 1979-80. See Annual Report, 1974, 1979 and 1982, supra, note 12.
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Table 3
Cases Investigated1 Under the Combines Investigation Act
for 45 Manufacturing Industries, 1970-1981
Industry Conspiracy Merger-Monopoly Pire Resale Price
Section 32 Section 33 Discrimination Maintenance
Section 34 Section38
MeatProducts 2 1 - -
Dairy Products 2 - - 3
Fish Products - - - -
Fruit and Veg - -
GrainMills - 1 - -
Bakery Products 1 1 - -
OtherFoodProd. 1 2 1 -
SoftDrinks 1 - - -
D istilleries - ...
B rew eries - ...
Tobacco Products - 1 - -
RubberProducts - - - 1
Leather Products - - - 4
Hosiery - - - 2
KnittingMills - -
Sawmills 3 - - -
Veneer and Plywood -..
Planing Mills .-
Household Furniture I - - 4
Pulp and Paper 2 1 - -
PaperBoxandBag I 1 - -
Iron and Steel Mills 1 1 1 -
Iron Foundries - -
BoilerandPlate - -.
Metal Stamping -.
Wire Products - -
Hardware 2 - - 1
Heating Equipment - -
Misc. Machinery - 1 - -
Agricultural Imp. - - - -
OtherMachinery - -
Aircraft/Parts - -
Motor VehiclesfParts 1 - 1
MajorAppliances - 1 - 3
RadioandT.V. - - -!
Comm. Equipment - -
Misc. Elec. Prod. 2 2 - -
Concrete Products 4 2 - -
Clay Products - -
Petroleum Ref. - I -
Pharmaceuticals 1 2 1 -
Paint/Varnish - - 1
Soap/CleaningCornp. - -
Industrial Chem. 4 6 - -
Sporing Goodaqdoys - - - 3
Source: Annual Reports of the Director of Investigation and Research 19781-1982.
1. Includes cases prosecuted and discontinued.
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The pertinent question is, why? Is the Act itself responsible,
and by extension the political decisions which put together the
legislation? After all, successive Canadian governments have
embraced efficiency as a clear antitrust goal. Or is it the Bureau, in
attempting to maximize its private utility function, which has
subverted the intent of the legislation? It is to these issues we now
turn.
II. UTILITY FUNCTIONS, CONSTRAINTS, AND THE
EFFICIENCY CRITERION
It is impossible to quantify the political and bureaucratic
reasons for the failure of the efficiency criterion to guide
enforcement practice. Therefore, our method is to approach the
problem in a more qualitative manner by modeling the Bureau as a
rational self interest utility maximizer, subject to the constraints
imposed by the legislation and the structure set up to administer and
adjudicate the statute. We then ask whether it is the difference in
objective functions - minimizing efficiency loss versus whatever
elements the Bureau is assumed to maximize - or the nature of the
constraints which lead to the enforcement pattern in Table 3 rather
than that implied by Tables 1 and 2.
If the Bureau's objective function gives rise to behavioural
predictions consistent with Table 3, then there are grounds for
believing that the goal of maximizing efficiency is being frustrated by
the bureaucracy maximizing its own private interests. Alternatively,
if it is the constraints that produce Table 3 compatible behaviour,
then it is due either to the actors in the adjudication process (the
courts, the Attorney General) maximizing their own utility functions,
or the legislation itself which, in turn, reflects the utility function of
the government.
It is useful to proceed as follows by: (i) specifying the
Bureau's objective function; (ii) identifying a disturbance, predicting
the Bureau's reaction in terms of case enforcement given (i), and
comparing these predictions with what we would expect if the
Bureau maximized efficiency; (iii) identifying the constraints and
analyzing their potential impact on the predictions in (ii); and (iv)
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assessing the constrained predictions of (iii) in terms of their ability
to explain the enforcement pattern of Table 3.
A. The Utility Function
We assume a modified Downs type utility function,41 and
following Jones,42 further assume that the primary goal to be
maximized is security and its minimum state survival Downs defines
security43 as "a low probability of future losses in power, income,
prestige or convenience," where these items are other potential
objectives in the utility function.
In the present context to maximize security means that the
Bureau would take an activist stance in an attempt to restore its
position because a removal or diminution in any of its functions
reduces prestige and power and hence security - reduces the
Bureau's raison d'etre - and ultimately survival. Faced with any
disturbance (an adverse legal decision, a change in the legislation)
which reduces security, several mutually consistent activist options
are open to the Bureau.
One, it can attempt to restore the status quo (maintain the
pre-disturbance security level) by administrative means. This may
entail attempting to replace court cases with administrative rulings,
for example. Two, if the disturbance affects one particular section
of the legislation, then internal enforcement resources could be
shifted to unaffected sections. The implication is that increasing
case activity in one section offsets the security losses in another
section. Three, it can attempt to change the impact of the
41 Strictly speaking, Downs' function applies only to individual bureaucrats. But here we
adopt the common assumption made in organization theory that there is agreement among the
members of some group responsible for the direction of the organization on the nature of the
organization's goals. See Jones, supra, note 13 at 273; and K. Acheson and J.F. Chant,
"Bureaucratic Theory and the Choice of Central Bank Goals: The Case of the Bank of
Canada" (1973) 5 . Mon. Cred. & Bankg. 637.
43 Supra, note 6 at 84.
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disturbance by challenging the case law, or pressuring the
government to change the legislation. In effect, the Bureau itself
becomes a pressure group.
In only two circumstances would the Bureau be passive.
One, a reduction in security could be followed by the acquisition of
some equally prestigious and powerful function. This represents a
straight non-security losing substitution. The second circumstance is
if the Bureau maximizes "convenience" which Downs defines as "a
resistance to changes in behaviour that increase personal effort, and
a willingness to accept those that reduce personal effort."45
Thus, any disturbance which reduces security should result in
the Bureau attempting to restore its position.
B. Disturbances and Unconstrained Predictions
What disturbances took place which affected security and
which would be expected to generate a reaction in case enforcement
in those sections of the Act covered by Table 3 in the 1970s?
While there have been a number of disturbances which potentially
affected the Bureau's security,46 we choose to concentrate initially
on the 1960 Beer-Sugar decisions which made horizontal merger an
offence only if monopoly was achieved and specific detriment
44 The power of the bureaucracy to influence policy in Canada should not be under
estimated. See K. Kernaghan and D. Siegel, Public Administration in Canada (Toronto:
Methuen, 1987) c. 11; and W. Baker "Power and the Public Service" (1987) 30 Can. Pub.
Admin. 14.
45 Supra, note 6 at 84.
46 On a case enforcement basis, the 1960 amendments to the Act gave the conspiracy,
resale price maintenance (RPM), and price discrimination (PD) sections added defenses. This
presumably made the Bureau's enforcement task more difficult and thus potentially reduced
security. But, there was virtually no impact in conspiracy cases, while RPM and PD were not
that important before or after 1960, so that case information is limited. In 1969, the addition
of the misleading advertising sections potentially increased power as it increased case
enforcement (see supra, note 40). The administrative change in 1966 which shifted the
Combines Investigation Branch (renamed the Bureau of Competition Policy) from Justice to
Consumer and Corporate Affairs, probably reduced prestige since the latter is a junior
ministry. However, it is difficult to isolate any case by case impact. All disturbances in the
1970s (changes in the case law and the 1976 amendments to the Act), resulted in attempts
to change the Act so that there was only limited case reaction.
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followed.47 The reason for our focus is that the alternative
predictions about case enforcement which arise from different
maximization assumptions (security versus efficiency) are somewhat
clearer for mergers than for the other offenses covered by Table 3;48
and we believe that what we have to say about the effects of the
constraints on merger enforcement generalizes to most other sections
of the Act.
The impact of the Beer-Sugar decisions was de facto to
remove merger as an offence under the Act, thus amputating a very
important function of the Bureau. Obviously, power (the ability to
determine who would be allowed to merge with whom), prestige (a
bureau's success in carrying out its social goals), and hence security,
were reduced and consequently survival threatened. We would,
therefore, expect some attempt to reassert the Bureau's position.
Of the alternatives considered in Part II, section A, above, we focus,
at this juncture, solely on case enforcement, although we shall argue
in section D below that a number of alternatives eventually came
into play. If constraints were absent, we would expect the Bureau
to actively attempt to reassert its pre-Beer-Sugar position: to
formally investigate cases substantially different from the extremes
of Beer-Sugar using a similar set of pre-Beer-Sugar economic criteria.
Does this expectation, based on a security-maximizing
assumption, conflict with a prediction about the Bureau's behaviour
based on the maximizing efficiency criterion? The answer is, only if
the courts are considered correct in economic terms.49 Suppose we
4 7 R. v. Canadian Breweries Ltd., [1960] O.R. 601, 33 C.R. 1, 126 C.C.C. 133, (the Beer
case), and R. v. British Columbia Sugar Refining Company Ltd (1960), 32 W.W.R. 577, 129
C.C.C. 7, 38 C.P.R. 177 (N.S.) (the Sugar case). For economic analysis see J.C.H. Jones,
"Mergers and Competition: The Brewing Case," (1967) 33 Can. J. Econ. & Pol. Sci. 551.
48 There is also more information available on case enforcement for mergers. In
addition, we do not know how many instances of conspiracy, PD, or RPM occurred over 1970-
1981; but we do know at least 4729 mergers took place. See Annual Report 1982, supra, note
12 at 59.
49 It should not be imagined that the decisions had anything to do with economic criteria.
In Beer the court rejected any consideration of efficiencies. Scale economies were not
considered because they would constitute "benefits" and the Act only mentioned "detriments."
See, R. v. Canadian Brewerie Transcript of Proceedings, 1960, at 4206; and Part II, section C,
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accept the extreme Austrian and Chicago generalizations that all
mergers promote efficiency5 This implies that the Bureau should
adopt a non-activist (non-interventionist) stance so that no
investigations need take place. Hence, there is a difference in
predictions - a difference in expected behaviour - depending on
whether the Bureau wishes to maximize security or economic
efficiency.
But, if we make any other assumption about mergers and
efficiency maximization, an activist approach (that is, an investigation
of cases which depart from Beer-Sugar) is de rigueur. Consider the
Williamson cost-benefit (market power/efficiency) approach, the most
widely accepted framework for analyzing mergers.51  Under
Williamson assumptions mergers require investigation only in extreme
situations because, normally, efficiency outweighs market power.
The difficulty, of course, is that it is virtually impossible, a pfiori, to
identify those mergers which create net benefits.5 Clearly, however,
they would be different from those identified by Beer-Sugar criteria.
Therefore, under Williamson assumptions, we would expect an
investigation of mergers before Beer-Sugar proportions are reached.
The pre-Beer-Sugar approach of the Bureau was also to
investigate extreme cases where mergers resulted in high market
shares.53 If the Bureau, in maximizing security, tried to restore this
1 in the text below.
50 Singleton, supra, note 3, c. 4-5.
51 See O.E. Williamson, "Economies as an Antitrust Defense: The Welfare Tradeoffs"
(1968) 18 Am. Econ. Rev. 18, and "Economics as an Antitrust Defense Revisited" (1977)
125 U. Pa. L Rev. 699.
52 For overviews of the problems involved see: Fisher and Lande, supra, note 26; PA.
Pautler, "A Review of the Economic Basis for Broad-Based Horizontal-Merger Policy," (1983)
28 The Antitrust Bulletin; and R.G. Harris and LA. Sullivan, "Horizontal Merger Policy.
Promoting Competition and American Competitiveness", (1986) 31 The Antitrust Bulletin.
53 This can be seen, for example, in the cases sent to the Restrictive Trade Practices
Commission (see infra, note 54) by the Bureau, which formed the basis for the Commission
Reports: Report Concerning an Alleged Combine in the Manufacture, Distribution and Sale of
Beer in Canada (Ottawa: Queen's Printer 1955); Report Concerning the Sugar Industry in
Western Canada and a Proposed Merger of Sugar Companies (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1957);
Report Concerning the Production, Distribution and Sale of Zinc Oxide (Ottawa: Queen's
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position, then this yields roughly the same activist prediction - only
extreme cases would be investigated - as we expect from the
Williamson approach. This is not to argue that the cases would be
identical or the conclusions would be the same; only that, if mergers
occurred amongst the leading firms in the industries in Table 2,
there is no reason to believe that they would be treated differently
whether the Bureau maximized security or efficiency.
By way of contrast, if the Bureau maximized power we would
assume that it would tackle a whole range of mergers significantly
different from those liable under either Beer-Sugar or security-
maximization assumptions. In effect and by analogy, power
maximization would be consistent with the 1968 Clayton Act merger
Guidelines, but security-maximization (defined by the Bureau's case
activity prior to, and the compliance program after, Beer-Sugar) is
more compatible with the 1982 and 1984 versions of the
Guidelines.s4
In general therefore, the Bureau's wish to act in accordance
with its announced intention (to maximize efficiency), by focussing
its merger enforcement activity on cases in those industries in which
the efficiency loss is greatest, is not incompatible with behaviour
based on the desire to maximize security. But we know from the
evidence of Tables 1, 2 and 3 that industries with the largest
efficiency loss were not preferred targets. Since this failure of
enforcement activity to mesh with efficiency is not the result of
conflicting objective functions, it must be due either to the fact that
no mergers justifying investigation took place in the industries with
Printer, 1958); and Report Concerning the Meat Packing Industry and the Acquisition of WilsU
Ltd and Calgary Packers Ltd by Canada Packers Ltd. The market share of those discontinued
and compliance cases (post the Beer-Sugar decisions) which the Bureau would have "formally"
investigated, was always in the "quasi-monopoly" category. See Jones, supra, note 13 at 285-
91.
54 The point is, that under the 1968 Guidelines market share was relatively small; but
under the 1982 and 1984 Guidelines market share is a lot larger. For a survey see, R.D.
Anderson and S.D. Khosla, "Recent Developments in Canadian and U.S. Merger Policy"
(1986) 7:3 Can. Compet. Pol'y Rec. 46.
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the largest welfare losses,55 or else, the constraints are such that
they restrict the Bureau's ability to deal with efficiency losses
through the merger laws.
It is to the constraints we now turn.
C. The Constraints
The constraints on the Bureau's ability to maximize security
or efficiency are the Act itself, the prosecution and adjudication
process encompassing the Courts and the Attorney General, and the
administrative latitude possessed by the Bureau in its investigative
activities. The process works as follows. If the Bureau believes, or
has reason to believe, that an offence has been committed under
the Act it launches a formal investigation. If evidence is found to
support this belief, the "normal" procedure5 6 is for the Bureau to
submit the evidence to the Attorney General who may, or may not,
decide to prosecute. Should the decision be to prosecute the venue
is the criminal courts since the Act is criminal law.
Although all these constraints are interrelated, for our
purposes it is most appropriate to start with the Act and work
sequentially through the courts, the Attorney General, to the
Bureau.
1. The Act
The most obvious expression of the government's political
preferences is found in the wording of the Act. Two points are
There is no public information available on who merged with whom, by industry. But
. Baldwin and P. Gorecki in "Mergers and Merger Policy in the Canadian Manufacturing
Sector 1971-79, Discussion Paper 297," Economic Council of Canada, 1986, maintain that
much of the merger activity strengthened the ability of small firms to compete.
56 Prior to 1976 the de facto "normal" procedure was for the Bureau to submit evidence
to the Restrictive Trade Practices Commission which subsequently published a report (see
supra, note 53). This practice was effectively discontinued in 1976 (Annual Report, 1976 supra,
at 17) and the new "normal" procedure was to go directly to the Attorney General. Hence we
will not discuss the continuing role of the Commission here.
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particularly relevant for viewing the Act as a constraint on merger
enforcement in particular and all offenses in general.
First, the one consistent commitment implicit in the
legislation is to the lack of "abuse."57 Hence, the Act either singles
out specific abuses (price discrimination, predation, misleading
advertising, etc.) or, more generally, covers conspiracy, monopoly
and mergers with the word "unduly" and the phrase "to the detriment
of." The implication of the wording (and its interpretation) is that
the offenses are behavioural and any market structure is acceptable
as long as there are no actions "abusing" market position. There is
no emphasis on structural and/or performance alone.
Thus, if firms in the industries in Tables 1 and 2 did not
engage in some demonstrable anticompetitive conduct, there would
be no challenge from the Bureau. It should be noted that the
efficiency loss calculations of Tables 1, and 2 are based on measures
of excess profits (W1, a performance measure), or the supposedly
close relationship between structure and performance (W3 ), or
advertising expenditure (W4). Since, in general, there is no indelible
relationship between structure and/or performance on the one hand,
and "abusive" anticompetitive behaviour on the other hand, the
wording of the Act is a substantial constraint on the Bureau's ability
to pursue industries with large efficiency losses.
Second, the reason for the longevity of the abuse criterion
is that the Act appears to be a continual response to the wishes of
the business community. This is clear from the attempts to revise
the Act which took place from 1970-19868 Canadian business,
displaying no commitment to efficiency or competition, fought
successfully to retain "unduly" and "to the detriment of' in the
5 7 Various criteria have been championed at various times but only the "abuse" criterion
has longevity. See in general P.K. Gorecki and W.T. Stanbury, The Objectives of Competition
Policy, 1888-1983 (Montreal: The Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1984); and for
legal emphasis on "abuse," G. Kaiser, Canada in J.0. von Kalinowski, ed., World Law of
Competition, Unit A, North America, Vol. 3A (New York: Matthew Bender, 1987) 1:0116].
58 The whole experience is covered by Brecher supra, note 17, and W.T. Stanbury,
Business Interests and the Reform of Canadian Competition Policy, 1971-1975 (Toronto:
Carswell/Methuen, 1977), and "The New Competition Act and Competition Tribunal Act: Not
with a Bang, But a Whimper" (1986) 12 Can. Bus. L. J. 2 at 4-8.
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legislation. It is almost ironic that the 1976 amendments to the Act
which were supposedly directed at clarifying the meaning of "unduly,"
only specified what unduly did not mean 9 However, accentuating
the negative is always a growth in industry in Canada.
To summarize, a political response to the demands of the
business community has resulted in the legislation being cast in
behavioural terms which may be at variance with efficiency losses
measured in performance or structural terms. The result is to
constraint the Bureau's activities even if it wished to challenge those
industries with the largest efficiency losses.
2. The Courts
While the wording of the Act emphasizes abusive behaviour,
the type of behaviour subject to stricture - the limits to "unduly"
and "to the detriment of' - is defined by the courts. The courts are,
therefore, pivotal as a constraint on the Bureau's activities.
Although the courts have been scorned for being too
mechanical in their application of precedent and too restrained in
their use of economic analysis, during the 1960s and 70s they
introduced substantive (perhaps quantum) interpretive changes in the
law which severely limited the behaviour which could be questioned
and the relevant economic analysisc' which could be applied. The
most important interpretive changes are as follows.61
First, as noted above, in the Beer-Sugar judgments, merger
was an offence only if monopoly resulted and specific detriment
followed. This was based on an interpretation of "unduly" which was
contrary to established legal precedent at the time. However, the
Beer-Sugar view of mergers was confirmed by the Supreme Court in
the Irving Newspaper (1977) case. Thus, merging firms in industries
59 Under s. 32(1.1) it was not necessary to prove that "unduly' meant "... eliminate,
completely or virtually, competition in the market."
60 See M.T. MacCrimmon "Controlling Anticompetitive Behaviour in Canada: A
Contrast to the U.S." (1983) 21 Osgoode Hall L. J. 569 at 569-70.
61 In general see Kaiser, supra, note 57, and C. Green, "Canadian Competition Policy at
the Cross Roads" (1981) Can. Pub. Pol'y 418.
[VOL. 28 No. 2
Canadian Antitrust 1970-1981
in Tables 1 and 2 would not be subject to an investigation unless
they monopolized the industry and specific detriment followed.62
Second, with monopoly there is no "structural" offence. The
ERCO (1970), Allied Chemical (1975), and Irving (1976) cases
establish that without price discrimination, predatory or exclusionary
behaviour, or any other such anticompetitive conduct there is no
offence.63 For all intents and purposes this is almost identical to the
merger sections of the Act.
Third, the Aetna (1977) and Atlantic Sugar Refineries (1980)
cases seemed to establish that in conspiracy cases it is necessary for
the Crown to establish both the "intent" to enter an agreement and
the "intent" to reduce competition. Contrary to established
jurisprudence, this implies a monopoly market structure plus specific
detriment and sets standards unlikely to be met by the Crown.
64
With conscious parallelism - which might be applicable in some of
the oligopolistic industries in Tables 1 and 2 if one accepts the
structuralist view that concentration facilitates collusion - the key is
what conduct constitutes sufficient evidence of agreement and thus
again involves behaviour. This makes it extremely difficult to obtain
a conviction.
65
Fourth, in the Beer case it was established that any act of
regulation by federal or provincial governments took precedence
over the Combines Investigation Act. The Bureau has taken the
62 R. v. K C Irving Ltd, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 408, 12 N.R. 458, 72 D.LR. (3d) 82 (S.C.C.).
For commentary and analysis see G.B. Reschenthaler and W.T. Stanbuy, "Benign Monopoly.
Canadian Merger Policy and the K.C. Irving Case" (1977) 2 Can. Bus. L. J. 135.
63 R. v. Electric Reduction Co. of Canada Ltd (1970), 61 C.P.R. 235; R. v. Allied
Chemical Canada Ltd, [1975] 6 W.W.R. 481, 29 C.C.C. (2d) 460, 24 C.P.R. (2d) 221, 69
D.L.R. (3d) 506. See Green, supra, note 61 at 427.
64 Aetna Insurance Co. v. R, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 731, 15 N.R. 117, 34 C.C.C. (2d) 157
(S.C.C.); Atlantic Sugar Refineries Co. Ltd v. Attorney General of Canada, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 644,
32 N.R. 561, 115 D.LR. (3d) 21 (S.C.C.). See also Annual Report, 1978, supra, note 12 at
16-21.
65 See W.T. Stanbury and G.B. Reschenthaler, "Oligopoly and Conscious Parallelism:
Theory, Policy and Canadian Cases" (1977) 15 Osgoode Hall L 3. 617; Kaiser, supra, note
57, 8:03[2] at 9-23.
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position that it will therefore not launch an investigation if some
degree of regulation is involved.c6 Thus, one possible reason why
Tables 1 and 3 do not match is that there could be a degree of
regulation involved in some industries. Unfortunately, we do not
know for sure because there is no data on the degree of regulation
in any industry. However, what we do know is that the extensive
amount of regulation that does exist in Canada, reduces the potency
of the Act to deal with efficiency loss.67 Certainly, when we move
from manufacturing losses detailed in Table 1 to economy wide
losses many industries - agriculture, utilities, transportation - are not
covered by the Act. In the same vein, the Jabour (1982) case
effectively removed most "professions" from the Act; and, if we
include the Uranium (1981) decision, Crown agencies are also
immune.
6s
In summary then, the courts have further narrowed the code
of conduct the Bureau could attack and at the same time seem to
focus on monopoly market structure. It is difficult to say what utility
function the courts are trying to maximize but the evidence is
consistent with the view that in the 1970s the Supreme Court of
Canada seems to have come out (intentionally?) from a Chicago
closet. It also means that few industries in Table 1 would be eligible
for investigation.
66 Annual Repor, 1966, supra, note 12 at 19. This is a legacy of the Beer judgement.
At issue, perhaps, is how much regulation should be involved. Kaiser feels it may be very
little, ibid 11:02 at 5.
67 In 1978 industries representing close to 30 per cent of the GDP were subject to some
form of direct regulation. See Economic Council of Canada, Refonning Regulation (Ottawa:
Ministry of Supply and Services, 1981). See also supra, note 35.
68 Attorney General of Canada v. Law Society of British Columbia; Jabour v. Law Society
of British Columbia, [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307, [1982] 5 W.W.R. 289, 66 C.P.R. (2d) 1 (S.C.C.); R.
v. Uranium Canada LtdILte, R. v. Eldorado Nuclear Ltd (1983), 50 N.R. 120, 8 C.C.C. (3d)
449, 4 D.L.R. (4th) 193. (S.C.C.). On Jabour and Uranium, see Anmal Report, 1983 and
1984, supra, note 12 at 14-15 and 12-20 respectively.
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3. The Attorney General and the Department of Justice
The Attorney General is the normal interface between the
Bureau and the court system. Here the decision is made as to which
of the Bureau's proposed prosecutions are to be translated into legal
action and, subsequently, if the cases are lost, whether they are to
be appealed. The bureaucracy here marches to a strictly legal
drummer and thus the decision to proceed will be made in terms of
legal criteria no matter how attractive (or unattractive) a case may
look in economic terms. Thus, the demonstrated antipathy of the
courts towards economic analysis will have a bearing on which cases
go forward for prosecution or appeal. If we assume that the
Attorney General wants to win cases - the primary element in the
objective function is to win69 - then we do not expect cases to test
the limits of the law or to be based on complex economic
arguments.
This adds to the constraints on the actions of the Bureau in
the general sense that it reinforces the actions of the courts.
Indeed, there is evidence that a substantial difference exists between
the cases proposed for prosecution by the Bureau and their
subsequent disposal by the Attorney General.70 We are not arguing
that the Attorney General is specifically responsible for the ill-
matching of Tables 1 and 3 but, that as a constraint on the Bureau's
actions, the Attorney General validates the constraints imposed by
the courts.
69 P K. Gorecki, The Administration and Enforcement of Competition Policy in Canada,
1960 to 1975: An Application of Performance Measurement (Ottawa: Consumer and Corporate
Affairs Canada, 1979) at 94.
70 P.K. Gorecki and W.T. Stanbury, "Canada's Combines Investigation Act: The Record
of Public Law Enforcement, 1889-1976," in J.R.S. Pritchard, W.T. Stanbury and T. Wilson
eds, Canadian Competition Policy: Essays in Law and Economics (Toronto: Butterworths,
1979) at 147.
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4. Administrative latitude
The final constraint on the Bureau's ability to maximize
security and/or efficiency on an industry basis is the administrative
latitude possessed by the Bureau. This is given either directly by
the statue or established by administrative practice. The latter is
possible because statutes are rarely drawn so tightly as to preclude
some administrative degrees of freedom. Thus, in some instances,
a bureau may circumvent the written word of the legislation to
pursue its own interests.
Both statutory and administrative "degrees of freedom" come
into play here. The Bureau must initiate an inquiry if directed by
the Minister, or if six citizens complain (sections 8(c) and 7(1)).
But, an inquiry "shall" be initiated if there is "reason to believe that
... an offence ... has been or is about to be committed ..." (section
8(b)(iii)). Therefore, the Bureau can initiate inquiries without the
benefit of formal direction or a six person complaint and thus it has
a degree of administrative discretion in its case selection. However,
the existing evidence suggests that most inquiries are based on
business complaints.71 This is defended by the Bureau on the
grounds that the word "shall" makes investigation mandatory and
insufficient resources do not allow greater latitude in inquiry
selection.
One area, however, in which latitude is practiced is in the
"compliance program," a situation where the Bureau vets, informally,
practices brought to its attention by business with a view to
determining whether a formal inquiry would be launched should the
practice continue.72 The evidence is that in the 1960s this practice
allowed the Bureau some discretion with mergers; but after Irving it
has degenerated almost solely into a vetting system for the pricing
practices sections of the Act.
The Bureau then has some administrative leeway, but the
evidence suggests that it has not used it as much as it could.
71 Ibid at 141-43.
72 Ibid. at 175-78.
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However, given the constraints imposed by the Act, the courts, and
the activities of the Attorney General, it is hardly surprising.
5. The constraints and the objective functions
What impact do the constraints have on the competing utility
functions? By and large, the effects of the constraints are the same
for merger offenses whether the Bureau wishes to maximize
efficiency or security. In our view, only if we take the extreme
Austrian-Chicago position (since efficiency is promoted by complete
non-interference with the market no merger should be challenged)
would the constraints have a differing impact on the objective
functions. The cause of maximizing efficiency would be promoted
because the constraints confine the Bureau's security maximizing
case activism.
This position can also be carried over to most other offenses
(Table 3) in the Act: collusion is transitory and can be safely
ignored because the transaction costs involved in maintaining the
agreement are too large; most private monopolies arise because of
efficiency considerations unless promoted by the State; price
discrimination can usually be efficiency justified; resale price
maintenance is almost always efficient; and predation just does not
happen. In short, the constraints promote efficiency. The corollary
of this position is that in Tables 1 and 2 we were not measuring
efficiency losses. The excess profits on which the calculations are
based are merely rewards to efficiency and innovation and not
expressions of market power.
However, under any other scenario of how efficiency and the
market work, it is the nature of the constraints that preclude
enforcement activity ir- those industries with the largest welfare
losses. If we believe that the offenses in the Act can reduce
efficiency loss, for a prosecution to succeed, given the constraints 1
through 4, the case would have to have the following profile: there
should be anti competitive behaviour (predation, price discrimination,
price fixing, etc.) in an industry characterized by monopoly, in which
there is no hint of regulation, and neither a Crown agency nor
profession is involved. Trying to find any industry to match these
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virtues is obviously the major reason why Tables 1, 2 and 3 do not
jibe.
As far as the particular constraints are concerned, the most
important consideration appears to be the political one. In our view
this covers not only the wording of the legislation - which is a
response to business pressure - but also the activities of the courts.
We include the courts as a political constraint not because of any
evidence that the judiciary is susceptible to business pressure, but
because the wording of the Act is "explicitly ambivalent."73 The
politicians have deliberately turned policy determination over to the
judiciary. Since this is a considered choice, governments should be
held accountable for the interpretations of the courts. If
governments disagree with the judicial interpretation of the Act then
they have the power to change the Act. Not to change the Act
signifies government endorsement of the courts' legal economics.
This is, again, revealed preference.
D. Corollaries and Alternatives
Given that the constraints are the prime determinants of
enforcement activity (or the lack thereof) there are three corollary
issues which should be addressed. Is a utility maximizing model
useful for explaining the Bureau's behaviour? If efficiency is not the
Bureau's operative goal, why does the Bureau continually claim it is?
Why does the government maintain that efficiency is the prime
concern of the Act when this is patently false?
The answer to the first question is that the reaction to the
Beer-Sugar disturbance may not be reflected solely in the Bureau's
case activity. As noted in Part II, section A, above, the security
maximizing Bureau has several options which can be pursued more
or less simultaneously. Thus, if utility maximization is not achieved
via one option it will turn to the others. In particular, it appears as
if the Bureau pursued two options.
73 The phrase is used by Bruce Dunlop in "Bora Laskin and Competition" (1985) 35
U. T. L. J. 429, to indicate that the government may have been deliberately passing the buck
to the courts.
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First, on a case basis, the Bureau could attempt to
circumvent the Beer-Sugar decision either "administratively" or by
formerly challenging the decision in court. It achieved the former
until the mid 1970s through the compliance program, and
accomplished the latter in the Irving case. However, the Irving
judgement put an end to the case approach.
The second option would be for the Bureau to attempt to
change the legislation. There is little doubt that in the protracted
drive to change the legislation, which began in 1970 and ended in
1986, the force keeping the process alive in the face of fierce
business pressure was the Bureau.74 While the 1986 legislation may
not be everything the Bureau wanted, it should be noted that the
new merger sections are quite close to the economic criteria the
Bureau has always touted.75 To this extent the second option was
clearly successful.
In short, the predictions of the security maximizing model as
to the options employed by the Bureau are in rough conformity with
the evidence on its behaviour. This suggests that the utility
maximizing model is a useful device for examining the Bureau's
behaviour.
Nevertheless, this leaves unanswered the question of why the
Bureau would claim that it is guided by efficiency considerations.
The answer that seems most reasonable to us is that the Bureau was
attempting to create, as Downs put it, an "ideology."76 That is, an
image of its operations (aspirations?) which does not reflect what it
actually does. With an "ideology" there is always a difference
between stated intentions and actual performance.
74 Of the "disturbances" that took place in the 1970s - primarily the legal decisions
discussed in Part II, section C, 2 above - the reaction of the Bureau was to attempt to rectify
them by changing the legislation rather than exercising any of the other options.
75 The criteria - a combination of structural, behavioural and efficiency factors - have
consistently appeared in every version of the legislation and proposed legislation since Bill C-
256 in 1970. For earlier Bureau versions see Jones, supra, note 13 at 281-82. For legislative
versions see Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Proposals for a New Competition Policy for
Canada, Second Stage (Ottawa: Supply and Services, 1977); and Competition Act 1966, s. 65.
76 Downs, supra, note 6 at 243.
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Roughly the same explanation applies to the issue of why the
government chose to emphasize the goal of "efficiency." "Efficiency"
is a useful "symbol."77  No government could come out against
promoting efficiency. But to put the means in place to actually
improve efficiency is something else. "Symbols" like "ideologies" are
ultimately empty.
III. CONCLUSIONS
There are three major conclusions from the analysis in Parts
I and II. First, there is no relationship between efficiency, as
measured by the efficiency loss by industry, and case enforcement
activity by industry in Canada. Indeed case enforcement selection
appears to have little relationship to economics at all.78 This is the
same result as yielded by similar studies in the United States.79
Second, the reason why there is no relationship is due
primarily to the political efforts of the government as encapsulated
in the wording of the statute and the implicit support of the
economic analysis of the courts. The Competition Act is largely a
response to the pressure of the business community. The fact that
the Bureau may wish to maximize its own utility function is not
responsible for the failure of efficiency based enforcement activities.
This is contrary to much current thinking about the antitrust
bureaucracy in the United States.
Finally, what is distressing to some economists is that we are
dealing with economic policy, the goals of which are supposedly
economic, but which is enforced on some other grounds.
Economists know that economists qua economists do not solely
determine ends. Nevertheless, if ends are drawn in economic terms
77M. Edelman, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1964).
78 After examining the Bureau's internal case files on the case enforcement that took
place from 1960-1975, Gorecki concluded that economic criteria play a minor role in case
selection. However, Bureau officials claim the converse. See supra, note 69 at 247.48.
Supra, note 18.
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(efficiency for example) then economists have a right to expect that
economic means (economic analysis) be applied to determine the
best way to achieve the given ends. It is not a case of arguing that
since there is less than unanimity over economic means (are you a
structuralist, a Chicagoite, an Austrian?), economic analysis should
be ignored. If some non-economic analysis is to be substituted then
economists and the general public have the right to expect policy
makers to explicitly specify that, although ends are economic, means
are not. By the same token, if ends are non-economic then policy
makers should say so. Unfortunately, this is too easy, too clear, and
therefore in the world of policy to be avoided.

